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The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty symbolized the end of the Cold War and the likely termination of this
treaty marks the beginning of a new era. On February 1, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States
(U.S.) would withdrawal from the INF Treaty citing repeated violations by the Russian Federation as cause for withdrawal. As
early as 2008, U.S. intelligence agencies reported missile testing by the Russian Federation of a cruise missile system that could
have a range between the limits outlined by the INF Treaty. The Russian Federation has repeatedly denied the allegations and
has suggested that the U.S. is actually in violation. The following manuscript details an overview of the INF Treaty, grievances
from both the U.S. and Russian Federation, potential reasons for violations, reasons for withdrawal from the treaty, and poten-
tial implications for terminating the treaty. Overall, deployment of intermediate-range missiles by the Russian Federation does
not change either nation’s limited deterrence stance or hinder second-strike capabilities. However, the missile system being
deployed by the Russian Federation is dual use. Dual use means that the system can be armed with either conventional or
nuclear warheads. The U.S. and Russian Federation must work to ensure clear designation of nuclear and conventional forces
so that if a conflict occurs, strikes do not appear to be reducing nuclear-armed assets and there is no ambiguity if an inbound
strike is from a nuclear armed weapon.
1 History and Overview of the INF Treaty
In 1976, the Soviet Union began deploying a nuclear armed intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) desig-
nated as the RSD-10 Pioneer or known by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the SS-20 Saber.
This missile had a range of 5500 km, carried one to three nuclear warheads, could be launched from a transporter
erector launcher (TEL), and had a solid fuel propellant system1. The Soviet Union’s deployment of the SS-20
with TELs and solid fuel propellant decreased their vulnerability to a first strike by being able to discreetly move
the launch system and added a faster response time without the need to fuel the missile2. Deployment of the mis-
sile system caused an immediate response by NATO which adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter the Soviet
Union. The first track called for arms control between the U.S. and the Soviet Union while the other track called
for the deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and ballistic missiles (GLBM) by 19833.
Negotiations in the following years failed and deployment of U.S. missiles went as planned.
It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
1985 that negotiations regarding arms control once again became a possibility. Gorbachev viewed the possibility
of nuclear war with the U.S. as appalling and thought the two nation’s military build up was detrimental to sta-
bility. Official negotiations began in the fall of 1985 with the Soviet Union offering an agreement that would allow
equal numbers of GLCMs effectively between NATO and Soviet states. The U.S. responded with an offer to limit
the number of launchers in Europe to 140 and constraining short-range missiles. Negotiations continued until
1987 when the treaty was officially completed. Under the INF Treaty, both the U.S. and Soviet Union within
three years of the treaty entering into force would eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between
500-5500 km along with all launchers, support structures, and support equipment for the designated missile sys-
tems3. The Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in December of 1987 at
a summit meeting in Washington. At its signing, the Treaty’s verification regime was the most detailed in the
history of nuclear arms control and was so to ensure compliance with the total ban on the use of short-range and
intermediate-range missiles3. In May of 1988, the U.S. Senate ratified the INF Treaty; entering the treaty into
force. Over the next three years, a total of 2,692 missiles were eliminated in a verifiable manner.
2 Russian Violations
As early as 2008, US intelligence agencies reported missile testing by the Russian Federation of a cruise missile
system that could have a range between the limits outlined in the INF4. The missile in question has officially
been designated the 9M729 by the Russian Federation which originally denied the existence of the type of GLCM.
The missile is designated as the SSC-8 under NATO, is capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear pay-
loads, and is believed to be a variant of a sea-launched cruise missile known as the 3M14 Kalibr that has a range
between 2000-2500 km5. According to US declarations and recently independently verified by European intelli-
gence agencies, the Russian Federation has conducted six tests of the 9M729 GLCM system that have violated
the limits of the INF Treaty6, 7. The longest test reached a range of 2,070 km. Interestingly enough, all tests of
the 9M729 system that fell within the prohibited limits of the INF were launched from a fixed system7. The Rus-
sian Federation has tested the 9M729 GLCM system from a mobile launcher, but the farthest-range test from a
mobile launcher was estimated to be 350 km. Theoretically the tests from the mobile launchers make the system
appear to be compliant with the INF Treaty. The Russian Federation has repeatedly denied the system in ques-
tion, the 9M729, violates the INF Treaty. In October of 2016, a Special Verification Commission was established
to address concerns and potential violations, but the commission did not lead to any resolutions or additional
cooperation8.
To increase transparency on the matter, the Russian Ministry of Defense held a press conference where briefings
were given by the Deputy Foreign Minister and the Chief of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation about the 9M728 and 9M729 missile systems9. The 9M728 is the system that the
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9M729 is based and may be a compliant GLCM9. At this briefing, the Russian Ministry of Defense showed mis-
sile canisters, launch vehicles, and schematics for both missile systems6, 10. Reported on by the Daily Beast, the
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency assessed that nothing shown by the
Russian Ministry of Defense at the press conference was actually of the 9M729 missile system6. The Daily Beast
does not cite their sources for this information and neither agency has made public comments on the Russian
Ministry of Defense press conference.
3 U.S. Violations
The Russian Federation has repeatedly denied the system in question, the 9M729, violates the INF Treaty and
has suggested that the US has committed the following violations: deployment of the MK 41 (Aegis Ashore) anti-
missile launch facility in Romania, testing anti-missile interceptors on INF violating missile targets, and using
armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)8.
The Aegis Ashore system is a modified version of the missile-defense system used aboard Aegis ships. The claim
by the Russian Federation is that the Aegis Ashore system would be compatible with Tomahawk cruise missiles
that have a range of up to 2500 km and are used in the Aegis system. The U.S. has made the following statement
regarding this accusation: the system “lacks the software, fire control hardware, support equipment, and other
infrastructure needed to launch offensive ballistic or cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk.”8, 11 In addition, the
U.S. has stated that the Aegis Ashore is only armed with Raytheon Standard Missile 3 interceptors12. These
interceptor missiles are explicitly allowed under paragraph 3 of Article VII in the INF Treaty: "If a GLBM is of a
type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall
not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply."3 It is unclear what steps would
need to be taken to prove to the Russian Federation that the system is a solely defensive interceptor system.
The U.S. has tested missile interceptors on modified ballistic missiles that used the booster systems from missiles
that violated the INF. Under the INF, specifically paragraph 12 of Article VII states that a system that would
otherwise violate the INF can be used for research and development projects that test other objects than the
booster3. The U.S. argues that since using these systems was to test missile interceptors and not test a new
intermediate-range ballistic missile, that it is not a violation of the INF8, 11.
The Russian Federation has stated that U.S. armed drones violate the INF Treaty because they match with the
treaty’s definition of a cruise missile8. A cruise missile is defined in the INF Treaty as: “The term "cruise missile"
means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of
its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that
is a weapon-delivery vehicle.”3 The U.S. argues that there are subtle distinctions for UAVs. UAVs are weapons
platforms, not weapons themselves and while unmanned, are still piloted remotely. The U.S. argues that UAVs
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are two-way reusable systems that are not restricted under the INF8.
4 Reasons for Violation and Withdrawal
4.1 Russian Balance of Power
The Russian Federation began expanding and modernizing their conventional warfare capabilities beginning in
2008. Particular advancements were made to be able to counter NATO forces. A major advantage NATO holds
over the Russian Federation and their allies is in terms of air power. NATO air forces consist of 5,094 fourth-
generation and 363 fifth-generation aircraft while Russian forces only consist of 1,251 fourth-generation aircraft
as of 2017. To counter this overwhelming advantage, Russia has developed a capable air-defense network consist-
ing of over 600 surface-to-air missile launchers across Russia and their allies as of 201713. Russia has also been
modernizing their armored capability with the T-72B3 tank and outnumber NATO tanks almost 6:113. The de-
velopment of the 9M729 missile system is no different than the advancement of these other systems. As stated by
Director of National Intelligence Coats, "We believe that Russia probably wants to be unconstrained by the INF
Treaty as it modernizes its military with precision-strike missiles that we assess are designed to target critical Eu-
ropean military and economic infrastructure, and thereby be in position to coerce NATO allies."7 Director Coats
went on to discuss that the 9M729 gives a low-cost and survivable weapons system to Russia giving more options
to attack targets and populations without using strategic weapons or other theater resources such as sea-launched
cruise missiles7.
One of the original reasons for the U.S. buildup of nuclear weapons was to be able to suppress or halt an inva-
sion consisting of conventional forces from the Soviet Union14. While standing NATO forces are outnumbered,
with the exception of aircraft, by Russian forces, the total possible armed forces significantly outnumber Russian
capabilities. The issue is the deployment of those forces would take considerable time. It is possible the 9M729
weapon system could be a weapon designed in a scenario to be able to stop a conventional invasion from NATO if
there was a substantial increase in forces.
4.2 United States’ Expansion of Capabilities in the Pacific
Withdrawal from the INF Treaty does not appear to be entirely for law-abiding reasons. There has been a grow-
ing concern in Washington about the imbalance between Chinese and North Korean missile systems in the Pa-
cific15. The U.S. withdrawal from the treaty allows for increased options in the Pacific arena and potential de-
ployment of conventional intermediate-range missiles. President Trump has already stated that the U.S. will
begin development of new missiles: "We will move forward with developing our own military response options
..."6 Since it will be assumed to be some time before the U.S. begins deploying intermediate-range missiles, if they
ever are deployed, it is not yet clear how China or North Korea will react.
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
When analyzing deployment or development of nuclear weapons or in this case nuclear delivery systems, it is
necessary to look at the nation’s nuclear posture. Both the U.S. and Russian Federation hold a "limited" posture2.
Although more detailed analyses exist that extensively detail U.S.16 and Russian17 nuclear doctrine, a limited
deterrence strategy suggests that nuclear weapons can be used tactically to limit a war or deny victory2. Both
the U.S. and Russia have a pseudo "no first use of force" (NFUF) policy. NFUF policies generally state that the
nation with the NFUF policy will not be the aggressor in a situation, but if they are brought into a situation
in which nuclear weapons are used, weapons of mass destruction are used, or their existence is threatened, they
reserve the right to use nuclear weapons2, 17. A "limited" posture additionally suggests that the nation believes
they will maintain second-strike capabilities in the event of an attack. Both the U.S. and Russia have invested
heavily into ensuring second-strike capability particular with the development and deployment of ballistic missile
submarines. The deployment of the 9M729 missile systems does not change second-strike capability for either
side. It gives Russia more survivable and versatile assets in the event of a major conflict, but will not change
their nuclear posture. The violation more-so adds to an existing climate of distrust that has been growing since
the invasion of Georgia in 2008.
Where this violation poses a problem is in the dual-use nature of the missile system. The 9M729 can be armed
with either a conventional or nuclear payload. It is currently unclear if Russia is required under any existing
treaty to disclose if these weapons are nuclear armed or would be limited in any way. Blurring the line between
conventional and nuclear assets leads to the two following issues. The side with the ambiguously armed missiles
may not know if a strike on them is specifically aimed at conventional or nuclear assets. If the side with the
ambiguity fears the loss of their retaliation capability, they may be more willing to respond with nuclear weapons.
Likewise, if the side with the ambiguity is using a dual-use weapon on another country, that country may make
the assumption that there is an inbound nuclear weapon and that they should respond in kind. While future
arms control negotiations do not seem likely at this point, it should be necessary to have separation and clear
designation of nuclear forces such that the aforementioned scenarios are not an issue.
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